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Confronting Kenneth Burke’s Anti-Semitism 
 
Janice W. Fernheimer 
 
As author of the earliest and most powerful deconstruction of Hitler’s use of symbols 
in the 1939 “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’” (hereafter referred to as RHB), Kenneth 
Burke is often championed as providing one of the most brilliant rhetorical analyses of 
anti-Semitism. Josef Schmidt writes that RHB was “a visionary and prophetic 
document whose profound examination proved to be only too true!”(1). Bryan Crable 
terms RHB “a systematic and relentless unraveling of Hitler’s anti-Semitism” (134). In 
his essay contextualizing RHB’s creation, “Criticism in Context: Kenneth Burke’s ‘The 
Rhetoric of Hitler’s “Battle,’’” Garth Pauley notes that RHB “has been heralded as one 
of Kenneth Burke’s greatest essays and as an exemplar of rhetorical criticism” (para 2). 
It is startling then, to hear Kenneth Burke confess to William Cahill on June 5, 
1989, at age 92, four years before Burke would die, that in his own words, he had been 
“very anti-Semitic” in his early life, an outlook that caused him shame and 
embarrassment in his later life.1 In the interview, Burke recounts his intellectual 
development in order to account for what he would term a transformation in his 
substance: “And then I got into—even anti-Semitism, a literary kind. Hitler fixed me 
up completely. I was very anti-Semitic, but I certainly got over it” (Cahill para 29). 
Although at first he qualifies his anti-Semitism as a “literary kind,” in the next two 
sentences he simultaneously underscores that he was both “very anti-Semitic” and that 
he “certainly got over it” (Cahill para 29, emphasis mine). As Cahill and others have 
pointed out, “Burke noted that anti-Semitism was common enough in those days and 
in his family,” though Burke was now “ashamed of it” (para 29, emphasis mine). Later in 
the same interview, Burke claims that he underwent a transformation from being “very 
anti-Semitic” for much of his life to finally “getting over it.”  Burke reiterates that “I 
got over the damn thing,” though he also emphasizes “it was there for quite a while” 
(Cahill para 29, emphasis mine). The unspecified proclamation “it was there for quite a 
while” leaves an important ambiguity hanging in the “quite a while.”  
Burke writes about the relationship between ambiguity and transformation in 
the Grammar of Motives: “it is in the areas of ambiguity that transformations take place; 
in fact, without such areas, transformation would be impossible” (Burke GM xix). At 
the end of GM he observes, “And a transformation is a change in substance or 
principle, a qualitative shift in the nature of motivation. The old motivation could then be said 
to be ‘substantially’ retained only in the rhetorical sense, as when we say that something 
is ‘substantially so’ because it is not so” (Burke GM 357, emphasis mine). Burke posits, 
in his interview with Cahill, that he had undergone a significant transformation in the 
nature of his attitudes and “motivations” toward Jewish people and the Jewish 
community. But did he truly and “certainly” get over the “damn thing” of anti-
Semitism? I am left to wonder if his use of “certainly” to describe how he “got over” 
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his anti-Semitism is an unwitting suggestion that the transformation is “‘substantially 
so’ precisely because it is not so.” 
 Amos Kiewe in his Confronting Anti-Semitism: Seeking an End to Hateful Rhetoric 
rightly calls scholars of rhetoric to confront anti-Semitism and even uses Burkean 
theory to illuminate its symbolic origins and expressions. Drawing on Burke’s theory, 
Kiewe argues that the root of scapegoating lies in its “motivational starting point” 
which Burke and Kiewe identify as “guilt” (17). For Kiewe, “guilt” is a “generic term 
that encompasses a host of experiences such as inadequacy, incompleteness, insecurity, 
and deficiencies” and such feelings are overcome by a “process that rhetoric scholar 
Kenneth Burke refers to as dramatis, whereby. . .the projection of counterforce such as 
scapegoating, victimage, and sacrifice of another or others . . .[helps to] achieve 
redemption and ultimately purification. . .” (17–18, emphasis in original). In Burke’s 
late correspondence he connects his own anti-Semitism to such “guilt” which he 
identifies in his own insecurity (Kenneth Burke to Malcolm Cowley, Letter, 15 
December 1983).2 
 As a Jewish scholar who has also used Burkean theory to offer analysis of 
none other than the complications of Jewish identity, and moreover, to argue for the 
importance of Jewish rhetorics,3 reading Burke’s admission of significant anti-Semitism 
gives me significant pause. It raises important questions about the nature and timing of 
the alleged transformation. If we accept the Burke at 92 explanation, how long did he 
harbor anti-Semitic views? Taking Burke at his word that his anti-Semitism did come to 
an end, when would he date its demise? Did Burke ever really get over it, or did he 
merely wish he did? And why is it that even though Burke himself admits this 
embarrassing and deep-seated prejudice, very few people in the field discuss it?4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I thank David Frank for calling my attention to the private correspondence cited throughout this essay. 
3 See also “Talmidae Rhetoricae,” Stepping Into Zion: Hatzaad Harishon, Black Jews, and the Remaking of Jewish 
Identity, (University of Alabama Press, 2014) and Jewish Rhetorics (Brandeis University Press, 2014), co-edited 
with Michael Bernard-Donals. 
4 To my knowledge, only two scholars mention Burke’s anti-Semitism in their scholarship: Bertelsen and 
Crable. The only scholar to explicitly discuss Burke’s negative attitudes toward the Jewish community at 
length is Dale Bertelsen in his 2002 article, “Kenneth Burke and Multiculturalism: A Voice of 
Ethnocentrism and Apologia.” Even in this essay where Bertelsen describes Burke’s “apparent 
ethnocentric tendencies toward the Jewish community” as “particularly vexing” (83), noting that Burke 
“often used examples of Jews that contributed to and perpetuated uncomplimentary stereotypes” (83) and 
“Burke’s indelicate choice of terms sustains pejorative stereotypes of Jews and the Jewish community” 
(84), he stops short of identifying Burke’s attitudes toward Jews as anti-Judaism or anti-Semitic. Instead, he 
follows Burke’s lead in identifying the “tendency to use indelicate language and to perpetuate unflattering 
stereotypes” as a “continuing embarrassment,” claiming that “Kenneth Burke’s early indiscretions and use 
of coarse language exhibit ethnocentric tendencies” (85). Detailed as his investigation into the issue is, it is 
surprising that Bertelsen treads so gently around these “embarrassments.” Even though this article was 
first published in 2002, as of January 27, 2016, Google Scholar suggests it has received limited attention in 
the field, cited by only one other scholar in more than a decade. Similarly, Bryan Crable, whose recent 
book Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke: At the Roots of the Racial Divide offers an insightful investigation of 
Burke’s relationship with Ralph Ellison and attitudes toward race mentions the anti-Semitic slurs as well. 
He writes of the 1968 Revised Preface: “This apologia—offered for the ‘bumpy passages’ in Burke’s early 
fiction—could also apply to portions of his correspondence that appear, to contemporary eyes, racist or 
anti-Semitic” (14). In his accompanying note 31 on page 179, Crable calls attention to the correspondence 
in the collection Jay edited, located in the collection’s index under “Burke, Kenneth, racial slurs of.” Citing 
an archived letter to Cowley (12 November 1921), Crable points out that Burke’s father was a member of 
an anti-Jewish golf club and that “Burke’s correspondence was often filled with such [ethnic/racial slurs] 
remarks” (179). Despite the ubiquity of such slurs, however, Crable contends “For present purposes, we 
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In this essay, I analyze Burke’s 1983 “A Letter from a Gentile,” his last public 
statement on the Jewish question, written at the age of 86, to determine how 
successfully Burke worked through his anti-Semitism and how this attempt relates to 
his broader theory of rhetoric as well as the field’s reception of this theory and Burke 
himself. In his private correspondence, Burke notes that this public letter is his most 
significant effort to apologize for and work through his anti-Semitism; he calls it his 
“one solace on that score” (Letter to Paul Jay, 5 December 1983, 1). In it, he refers to 
other texts related to his attitudes towards Jewish people—both those that shaped him 
such as Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice and Sir Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe, and those he 
wrote in response to these attitudes: his 1935 review of Goethe and the Jews in The New 
Masses, his later “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’,” Rhetoric of Motives, and the “Revised 
Preface” to The Complete White Oxen are some of the texts he mentions specifically in 
the 1983 “Letter.”  
 By carefully analyzing the 1983 “Letter,” his last public effort as a scholar to 
confront the Jewish question, as one of several Burkean attempts to call attention to 
and apologize for what Burke terms his earlier ethnocentric “embarrassments,” I will 
make an uncomfortable point. Burke struggled with racism and anti-Semitism 
throughout his life and attempted to work through both with his scholarship. Though 
Burke himself would like to dissociate his later, more self-aware self from his earlier 
more anti-Semitic self to claim he “got over the damn thing,” and scholars in our field 
would like to do the same, I contend Burke never did fully “get over it.” Rather, he 
wrestled with anti-Semitism and the anti-Judaism it grew out of and the later color-
based racism it helped shape over the course of his life. He continually oscillated 
among several competing and troubled identifications, often with Jews themselves.  In 
what follows, I trace the trajectory of Burke’s anti-Semitism up to the 1983 “Letter,” 
provide a close reading of the “Letter” as Burke’s last sustained effort to escape from 
anti-Semitism, and then outline the implications of my study.  
The Trajectories of Burke’s Anti-Semitism 
Burke developed his anti-Judaic attitudes as a result of his family and surrounding 
culture. Burke’s father was an anti-Semite. Burke’s relatives united against him by 
calling him “Jew” and one of his uncles called his father a “Kike” because he didn’t like 
him (Kenneth Burke to Paul Jay, Letter, 5 December 1983).5 In his correspondence 
with Paul Jay, Burke admits that “I myself had never met a Jew personally until I met 
Malcolm’s friend, Jake Davis, at Peabody High” (Kenneth Burke to Paul Jay, Letter, 5 
December 1983). Burke also encountered these attitudes in his formal education where 
he read and identified with texts such as Ivanhoe and Merchant of Venice that perpetuated 
anti-Jewish stereotypes. The absence of substantive interaction with real Jewish people 
enabled Burke to absorb unquestioningly the negative stereotypes associated with Jews 
and money he encountered in literature and his family. These familial, educational, and 
literary interactions deeply impacted Burke, so much so that even in the moments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should simply conclude that all of these statements reflect the ubiquitous hierarchies of race that Burke 
and his fellow Pittsburghers internalized” (179). Like Bertelsen, Crable too follows Burke’s own impulse to 
collapse the agent’s motives into the historical scene and absolve Burke of anti-Semitism. 
5 “I recall two brothers (second cousins of mine) who fought each other like friends, but playfully united 
by, in almost every other sentence, addressing me as ‘Jew.’ One of my uncles didn’t like my father, ‘hence’ 
called him ‘Kike.” (Kenneth Burke to Paul Jay, Letter, 5 December 1983), emphasis mine.  
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when he attempts to apologize for his own self-recognized anti-Semitism, he cannot 
overcome the depths of these early anti-Jewish influences.  
 Even when he was authoring anti-Semitic slurs as part of what he calls his 
“stylistic groove” (Letter to Paul Jay 5 December 1983, 1), he did not engage in 
eliminationist anti-Semitism; rather as he self-described it, his was a more “literary” 
type. As Daniel Goldhagen has noted in Hitler’s Willing Executioners, not all anti-
Semitism is created equal. Goldhagen defines “eliminationist anti-Semitism” as a 
“virulent and violent. . .variant of anti-Semitism,” a strain which he argues, “existed in 
Germany well before the Nazis came to power” and which “called for the elimination 
of Jewish influence or of Jews themselves from German society” (23). That said, 
literary anti-Semitism affects and shapes the imagination that is the bridge to 
eliminationist anti-Semitism. As Burke himself writes in the Rhetoric of Motives, “Once 
you think of the imaginal, not as inducement to action, but as the sensitive suspension 
of action, invitations that you might fear in rhetoric can be enjoyed in poetry” (Burke RM 
91, emphasis mine). This characterization of the imagination is quite chilling when read 
in light of Burke’s own anti-Semitic slurs.  
 Earlier in the RM Burke notes that “poetic language is a kind of symbolic 
action, for itself and in itself, and whereas scientific action is a preparation for action, 
rhetorical language is inducement to action (or to attitude, attitude being an incipient 
act),” thus emphasizing the important function of language in shaping attitudes (Burke 
RM 42). Since Burke deeply understands the ways literature, in creating attitudes that 
become incipient actions, provides a very important type of “equipment for living,” it 
is surprising that later in his life he attempts to “excuse” his earlier anti-Semitic remarks 
by suggesting they are “merely” stylistic.  
  As I will demonstrate in my reading of the 1983 “Letter,” Burke was 
ultimately unsuccessful in his struggle to overcome his anti-Judaism, a finding that has 
important ramifications for the way we think about and employ his theory and critical 
oeuvre, replete as it is with the terministic screens and blind spots that come with his 
prejudices. When he revisited his earlier writings late in his life, Burke felt tremendous 
shame and embarrassment for his earlier “indelicacies of parlance.” Even though he 
could not fully overcome the anti-Judaism girding the actions, at the very least his later 
remorse demonstrates that he was both conscious and self-conscience of these earlier 
expressions of anti-Semitism and, in his own words, he was trying to “absolve himself” 
of his earlier misguided actions (Kenneth Burke to Malcolm Cowley, Letter, 7 
December 1983, 1).   
 Before discussing Burke’s public attempts at apology, I draw from David 
Nirenberg’s Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition to make an important distinction 
between anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism, demonstrating how the latter is much broader 
than the former. Nirenberg explains that anti-Judaism is “a way of critically engaging 
the world. It is in this broad sense that I use the words Judaism and anti-Judaism. And it 
also for this reason that I do not use anti-Semitism. . . .” (3). While Kiewe calls attention 
to the need for greater rhetorical analysis of anti-Semitism, characterizing it as a school 
of thought that arose from Christians’ need to differentiate themselves from the earlier 
Jewish religion that still existed, Nirenberg expands the concept of anti-Jewish thinking 
to include other anti-Judaic attitudes, and thus also traces its origins even to the period 
of antiquity with the ancient Egyptians, way earlier than the anti-Christian framework 
upon which Kiewe focuses. Nirenberg cogently argues that an Egyptian tradition 
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growing out of the work of Manetho characterized Jews in decidedly negative terms 
that remained “remarkably stable” over time and included the following assumptions: 
“1. The Jews are a people once driven out of Egypt. 2. Their practices are diametrically 
opposed to those of all other peoples, especially Egyptians and Greeks. 3. They are 
enemies of all the gods. 4. Whenever and wherever they rule, they rule brutally and 
tyrannically. 5. They are misanthropes, enemies not just of Egypt, but of all mankind” 
(30–31). Nirenberg emphasizes that while the first point “was of interest primarily to 
Egyptians; the others prove so useful that they continue to provide cornerstones for 
ideologies up to the present day” (31). He implicates none other than the great “father” 
of Western rhetoric, Aristotle, for his political philosophy that “understood tyranny as 
a form of misanthropy” as perpetuating a myth that contributed to the interpretation 
of the “struggle against tyranny” as a “struggle against the Jews” (39).6 For Nirenberg, 
anti-Judaism is an early and powerful ideological apparatus that provides a rhetorical 
inventional topos, which “would remain available to later millennia. . . .and [be] put to 
new uses by later generations of apologists and historians” (46). Consequently, “anti-
Judaism should not be understood as some archaic or irrational closet in the vast 
edifices of Western thought. It was rather one of the basic tools with which that edifice 
was constructed” (Nirenberg 6). Nirenberg argues that as part of the deepest structures 
of Western thought, anti-Judaism is foundational to much of the intellectual tradition 
we inherit in the West. 
 As part of that Western tradition, Burke seems unable to escape his anti-
Judaism fully. Perhaps ironically, the depth of Burke’s entrapment becomes most 
illuminated at the precise moments when he attempts to confront his own anti-
Semitism, which he tries to make innocent with scenic explanations that suggest the slurs 
he uses were merely stylistic choices that were a product of his historical moment. In the 
Grammar of Motives, Burke details precisely the type of linguistic acrobatics that he 
engages in to anesthetize his anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism. He writes, “we may note 
a related resource of Rhetoric . . . one may deflect attention from the criticism of personal motives 
by deriving an act or attitude not from traits of the agent but from the nature of the situation” (Burke 
17, emphasis mine). By dissociating the slurs from the person who made them, Burke 
attempts to attribute them to the scene he lived in and through instead of to the agent 
he once was and continues to be. Even more disturbing, in the “Letter” that he 
identifies as his “one solace” on account of his use of slurs, Burke moves from anti-
Jewish to anti-Israel sentiments, sometimes within the same sentence. This slippage 
shows the extent to which Burke both recognizes the problems associated with anti-
Judaism and the depth to which his thought is steeped in it. He enacted his theory of 
scenic deflection by casting his anti-Semitism as literary and as his anti-Judaic 
comments as a function of his scene.  
 I.  1968: Scenic Deflection  
The first time Burke offers a public apology for what he terms his ethnocentric 
“embarrassments” and engages in this type of scenic deflection is in 1968. When the 
University of California Press published a revised edition of Burke’s The Complete White 
Oxen, Burke provided a “Revised Preface.” The Preface’s final paragraphs read as 
follows: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See also Deborah Holdstein’s “The Ironies of Ethos.” 
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Two words on two embarrassments, and I shall be through: 
I grew up in an uncouth age and neighborhood in which it was 
taken for granted that minorities “normally” referred to one 
another as Dagoes, Hunkies, Niggers, Micks, Kikes, and such, 
along with our sound suspicion that we were all minorities of one sort 
or another. (Imagine the stigma, for instance, of living in 
Brushton rather than Homewood, or Homewood rather than 
Squirrel Hill, and so on.) Thus, some of my early stories show 
occasional pre-Reichstage Fire laxities. Since then, Hitler and 
his noxious Ism have made it hard even to remember the 
climate in which such laxities were taken for granted.7 Gone 
for ever [sic] (and perhaps for the better) are the days when it 
could be considered good clean fun, at a booze party, if Whitey 
the goy sang Negro spirituals in a Yiddish accent. I leave the bumpy 
passages as they were. First, they’re not so tough anyhow. And 
second, I have the firm conviction that my subsequent work makes my 
position quite clear on the subject of ethnocentric bias, except that in 
the sense of culture as a picture gallery that can liberally 
accommodate many different kinds of portrait and 
portraiture. (xvii, emphasis mine) 
In this awkward apology, Burke makes several interrelated dissociative moves to make 
his earlier anti-Semitism seem “innocent.” While on the surface it appears that he is 
trying to apologize for what his then-current-1968-self rightly interprets as 
inappropriate and offensive ethnic/racial language authored by his younger self; upon 
closer examination, the apology itself is so qualified that it begs the question of Burke’s 
motives, even in 1968. I point out this tension between style and content because it is a 
tension that reappears each time Burke publicly tries to account for the 
“embarrassments” of his earlier years. It is also a dissociative move that Burke employs 
to separate himself from the embarrassing words he authored earlier in his life. 
 In this revised Preface, Burke proclaims that he grew up in an “uncouth age 
and neighborhood” where it was “taken for granted that minorities referred to one 
another” with a long list of ethnic/racial slurs: “Dagoes, Hunkies, Niggers, Micks, 
Kikes, and such.” In this quick and easy sentence, Burke suggests that in engaging such 
slurs, he is merely a product of his historical/environmental “scene”—one that was rife 
with ethnic/racial tension and one whose language reflects those tensions. He 
dissociates the agent (his earlier self) from the historical scene, to displace responsibility 
for the “stylistic” word choices in the social norms of the earlier time. In that very 
same sentence Burke employs syntax that suggests he believes himself to be part of 
one of these minorities: “our sound suspicion that we were all minorities of one sort or 
another.”  
 The use of “our” groups Burke in with other minorities while defusing the 
very real differences in lived experience that members of these minorities would have 
encountered as minorities. This more inclusive “our” simultaneously deflects attention 
away from the powerful sting of a person of relative privilege engaging in such slurs. 
As Bryan Crable points out, though Burke “might have suspected otherwise, even in 
the early 1900s Burke occupied a quite favorable position within the American racial 
drama” (15). To occupy a position of relative privilege but perceive oneself as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Crable and Bertelsen offer critical context for this admittedly odd apology, and yet, they tend to stop 
here, without quoting or including the next line, which provides what I would argue is the most telling 
part—where anti-Jewish and anti-black attitudes are linked in the sentence that follows.  
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persecuted minority points to some of the blindnesses of Burke’s terministic screens 
when it came to racial and social hierarchies. One of Burke’s more complicated and 
troubled identifications is his self-identification as part of a persecuted minority and 
with Jews themselves; this identification reappears in his later 1983 “Letter.”  
  But here in the preface, Burke moves from ethnic/racial terrain to that of 
socio-economic status calling attention to the relative social prestige associated with 
various parts of Pittsburgh,8 and, from here, he suggests that “some” of his “early 
stories” engage in stylistic “laxities.” In this way, he continues his attempt to qualify 
and mitigate the perception of his stories, arguing that only “some” of these “earlier” 
stories engage in “laxities” of a stylistic or what he would later term “literary” nature. 
The dissociation of style from content furthers the dissociation Burke makes to 
discredit the seriousness of the offense. He also continues to flesh out the scenic 
explanation—claiming that Hitler and the (here unnamed anti-Semitism) “Ism” he 
represents make it “hard to remember” a time when such “laxities” were “taken for 
granted.” In this odd sequence, it is Hitler’s actions rather than Burke’s own self-
awareness which cause the change in permissiveness that allows for such slurs to be 
made without notice. The syntax of the text suggests that it is not so much that Burke 
realizes they are offensive and chooses not to use them, but rather the fact that they are 
no longer deemed socially acceptable or appropriate that makes Burke wish he had not 
used them in the first place.  
 The scene, after the tragic consequences of the Holocaust, had changed 
dramatically, and, in 1968, Burke was now ashamed of his “pre-Reishtage Fire 
laxitites.” Of course, it is because of Hitler and the horrific threat Burke rightly 
perceived as inherent in Hitler’s rhetoric that Burke authored “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s 
‘Battle’,” arguably the most insightful and piercing piece of rhetorical criticism to 
analyze Hitler’s anti-Semitic logic. Yet, here, this oscillation between scenic 
contextualization and dissociation of verbal style from content combine to create a 
dual excuse for “getting Burke off the hook.” This dualism is accompanied by a further 
interconnection that links his anti-Judaism to his racism as illustrated in the next 
sentence where “Whitey the goy” engages in double appropriation. 
 After his attempts to make the slurs more innocent than they first appear, 
Burke then laments the earlier moment when “it could be considered good clean fun” 
for “Whitey the goy” to sing “Negro spirituals in a Yiddish accent.” Although he 
acknowledges that such days are “gone for ever,” he undermines the sincerity of his 
apologetic account when he includes the hesitancy “[p]erhaps for the better.” This 
rather unapologetic apology is authored in 1968, four years after the civil rights act 
passed and the same year that Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated.9 Moreover, 
1968 is a year famous for the myriad social movements that took shape to increase the 
rights accorded to women, students, and African Americans while also protesting the 
Vietnam War. At the very least, Burke expresses a nostalgic longing for what he 
perceives to be a “simpler” time when such verbal so-called indelicacies could simply 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Crable points out, Squirrel Hill was a considered a “predominantly Jewish” neighborhood (16, and 
also note 38 pages 179-180). 
9 I thank my colleague and friend Nazera Sadiq Wright for the insight that when national laws are passed 
that give blacks more rights, such as with Plessy v. Ferguson or Brown v. Board of Education, whites reacted to 
these laws by lamenting their loss and longing for the past when they did not have to be racially aware and 
follow laws.  
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“be taken for granted”. Here it is worth pointing out that Burke’s imagined “good clean 
fun” is dually appropriative, where “Whitey the goy” not only sings “Negro spirituals” 
but does so in a “Yiddish accent,” so as to link and amplify the outsider status of both 
Blacks and Jews in this scene.10 This image also calls attention to the types of behavior 
Burke seems to deem funny or entertaining. For a critic whose theoretical apparatus 
rests heavily on the transcendent power of both images and the comic, it is disturbing 
that here both elements are used in such a culturally appropriative way.  
 Burke moves from what is now a truly repellant image to a further 
qualification that the “bumpy passages” remain intact for two reasons. One, Burke 
doesn’t think they were “so tough anyhow” and two, he believes his “subsequent work 
makes my position quite clear on the subject of ethnocentric bias.” It seems that Burke 
is alluding to none other than “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’” which had garnered 
him significant critical attention, and according to this preface, “absolved” him of his 
earlier laxities.11 These two qualifications—(1) the slurs were not so bad and (2) his 
later work and the critical apparatus they set forth make up for his earlier 
indiscretions—suggest that Burke, though authoring an apology, does not seem to 
think it is truly necessary to apologize. What is so striking to me is just how flippant 
and unapologetic this apology reads. For a later Burke concerned about his reception, 
he is remarkably comfortable with his earlier “embarrassments” or at least projecting 
that he is. Rather than claiming full responsibility for his earlier lapses, acknowledging 
the real harm they have done, he instead qualifies at every step of the way, first with 
historical/scenic context, then with dissociation, and finally by suggesting the earlier 
mishaps were not so bad after all. By 1983, Burke’s deflections of his anti-Semitism 
had evolved.   
II. 1983: Burke’s Vexing Anti-Semitism and the “Letter from a Gentile” 
In May, a month before Burke wrote the 1983 “Letter,” he had been in touch with 
Paul Jay about the “Cowley/Burke correspondence project” (Paul Jay to Kenneth 
Burke, Letter, 19 May 1983) which was later published by UC Press in 1988. What the 
correspondence with Jay demonstrates is that in the month preceding his authorship of 
the “Letter from a Gentile,” Burke had been revisiting his earlier correspondence with 
Malcolm Cowley and confronting his earlier self, whose self-styled “stylistic groove” 
engaged in slurs a whole lot more often than the Burke of 1983 had remembered. His 
continued correspondence with Jay and Cowley concerning the collection and the 
“Letter from a Gentile” convey that Burke is both “vexed” and “stumped” by this 
discovery of his earlier anti-Semitic self (respectively, Letter to Cowley 15 Dec. 1983, 1; 
Letter to Jay 5 December 1983, 3 [though it is actually page 4 of the letter]).  
 In December of 1983, after Burke authored and published the “Letter from a 
Gentile,” he again writes to both Jay and Cowley to discuss his use of the slurs. His 
December 5, 1983, letter to Jay expresses great concern over their place in the in-
process collected letters. Explaining that he had been in a car accident which thankfully 
“did no personal damage except to my self-esteem (which, as you can well imagine, 
suffered humiliating injury in re the slurs that marked some of my old letters—and though 
they’re dated more than sixty years ago, they make me feel as dirty as though I were still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Burke repeatedly mentions the “Negro spirituals” in the apologies, RM, and his private correspondence. 
In the 1983 “Letter,” he mentions the spirituals on page 164. 
11  See Pauley and Selzer and George (201-203) on the formation of RHB. 
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caught in that stylistic groove)” (Kenneth Burke to Paul Jay, Letter, 5 December 1983, 
emphasis mine), Burke underscores the discomfort he feels around his earlier usage; he 
bluntly proclaims they cause him to suffer “humiliating injury” and “they make me feel 
dirty.” Given the stereotypes of “dirty Jews” that Burke perpetuates in the public letter, 
this admission of feeling dirty in the private correspondence is an interesting choice. 
Burke declares that he is no longer caught in “that stylistic groove,” though his selected 
examples in the “Letter from a Gentile” belie the depth of the anti-Jewish attitudes that 
gird the “stylistic groove.” Burke then describes his “Letter from a Gentile” as his “one 
solace on that score.”  
Having enclosed a copy of the 1983 “Letter” in his letter to Jay, Burke 
remarks, “The comments which I have marked in red on p. 164 clearly indicate the 
source of the stylistic obscenity. The ‘great democratic melting pot’ in which I grew up 
divided the population into the many racial or religious sectors (both local and 
attitudinal) which invariably had epithetical slurs for referring to each of the others. 
And a sense of ‘togetherness’ was most spontaneously confirmed by conversing with 
someone who used the same slurs.” In this December letter, he more bluntly and 
directly launches into the scenic explanation. At the same time, the page 164 he 
highlights refers to the portion of “Letter from a Gentile” where he attempts to 
repudiate his earlier use of the epithet “Jew bastard” in a 1935 New Masses review of 
Goethe and the Jews. In the private letter to Jay, he upgrades the severity of the 
condemnation he issues for this earlier word choice. In contrast to his other 
“indelicacies,” at this point in December 1983, he considers the 1935 usage a “stylistic 
obscenity.” 
 Although Burke upgrades the condemnation of the epithet in his private 
correspondence, the context in which his apology and condemnation appear in the 
published “Letter from a Gentile” not only underscores his attempts to offer “scenic 
explanations” but also reveals the anti-Israelism he slips into while making such scenic 
justifications. This slip reveals a more deep-seated and unacknowledged anti-Judaism. 
 In the public “Letter from a Gentile” Burke introduces this so-called apology 
“circumspectly” by means of a “modulation” which recalls the ethnic slurs his father 
used:  
In his early years, in a typical ‘melting pot’ city marked by its 
distinct ethnic neighborhoods and their mean words for one 
another, my father’s mode of livelihood cut across this 
German-Irish division. And given his liking for the fun of 
things, speaking from the German side, he never said (I never 
heard him say) ‘that’s a dirty trick.’ He always said, ‘That’s a 
dirty Irish trick (164).12  
The discourse here sounds familiar because it follows the same rhetorical moves of his 
1968 revised preface, where Burke displaces the responsibility for the slur in the scene, 
instead of squarely on the agent responsible for making them—in this case his father. 
From this modulation, Burke then turns specifically to what he terms the “Jew-Gentile 
relationship” a section to which I will give greater attention in a moment, and then to 
an explanation of his own earlier “ethnic embarrassment,” which he attributes to the 
“delicacies of parlance.” Attempting to account for his 1935 use of the epithet “Jew 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  See also Crable on Burke’s specific identifications vis–à–vis his familial heritage, 14-15. 
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bastard” in his New Masses review of Goethe and the Jews, in the “Letter from a Gentile,” 
Burke writes:  
 But I should say: when introducing the anecdote of 
my German-Irish father’s invariably saying not ‘that was a 
dirty trick,’ but ‘that was a dirty Irish trick,’ I had in mind an 
ethnic embarrassment that must be confronted with regard to (let’s call it) 
‘the delicacies of parlance’ as they bear upon matters of 
dispersion. My anecdote was designed as a modulation into 
an otherwise blunt concern with these contrasting situations: 
 ‘One guy gets sore at another guy. In a case of that 
sort, the stylistic proprieties are such that the one guy refers 
to the other guy as a ‘bastard.’ But if the grouchy guy is a goy 
and the grouched-at guy is Jewish, in that case, the proper 
appellative is not just ‘bastard’ but ‘Jew bastard.’ And the 
‘delicacies of parlance’ are here a wry reflection of the term 
‘Judeo-Christian’, which in itself is a quite reasonable 
hyphenation, and does reflect the identity, not just individual, 
but ‘tribal’ in terms of which the grouched-at guy himself had 
asked to be identified.” (164) 
Here Burke uses juxtaposition to suggest his slurs like his father’s were a product of 
the historic moment and the attempt to “fit in.” As such, they are “a wry reflection of 
the term ‘Judeo-Christian’ which in itself is a quite reasonable hyphenation.” Again, 
using juxtaposition, this time, by pointing to the hyphen between “Judeo–Christian” 
and underscoring how it is “reasonable,” it seems that Burke hopes his readers will 
deem his earlier usage of “Jew bastard” as “reasonable” as well. Although the private 
correspondence with Jay suggests Burke found this particular “indelicacy” to be a 
“stylistic obscenity,” here in the public letter, Burke attempts to temper the severity of 
the stylistic mishap by suggesting it is “merely” a stylistic choice. Yet, for a critic who 
pays so much attention to the power of style and form, it is odd to see Burke engage in 
this type of dissociative acrobatics that fail to acknowledge that the stylistics shape and 
reinforce attitudes, which are in and of themselves reflective of and responsible for 
“incipient actions.” He concludes this section of the letter with a simple “So much for 
that embarrassing pleasantry. And at this point, for reasons that the remaining pages 
should make clear, we must proceed in another dimension” (164, emphasis mine), and 
quickly changes topic.   
While Burke may quickly change topic in the public letter, suggesting he is 
ready to move on, his private correspondence shows that the earlier uses haunt him, 
and in fact, he is unable to move on.  A week later, in his private correspondence with 
Jay of December that same year, Burke is “stumped” by his own use of ethnic slurs. 
(Kenneth Burke to Paul Jay, 5 December 1983, 3 [though it is actually page four of the 
letter]). He is still thinking about his use of the slurs two days after he sent a follow-up 
December letter to Jay when he writes Malcolm Cowley on December 7, 1983. He 
writes, “The enclosed copy of the ‘Gentile’ letter is selections from a much longer batch 
of stuff on and around the subject. I dare hope that these pages will absolve me of my slurs exuded over 
60 years ago. I also enclose a copy of my letter to Paul Jay, and a copy of a related 
passage in my preface to The Complete White Oxen volume” (Kenneth Burke to Malcolm 
Cowley, Letter, 7 December 1983). In this letter to Cowley, he connects the revised 
preface to the “Letter from a Gentile” in purpose and explicitly claims that he hopes 
that the later letter will provide absolution for the “slurs” of his youth.   
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A week later on December 15, 1983, Burke again writes to Malcolm Cowley, 
“vexed beyond measure” by these “embarrassments” (Kenneth Burke to Malcolm 
Cowley, 15 December 1983). He writes:  
Damn! I glanced at some more pages of the 
correspondence. That filthy slur does keep turning up. I had 
almost totally forgot how recurr {sic} it was. I am vexed 
beyond measure.  
 It’s a vulgar kind of snobbery, a reflect of my 
considerable insecurity. Somehow or other my confronting of it gets 
all mixed up with my car accident, which I go on reliving. And my need 
to clear up so much Unfinished Biz also keeps me so much 
‘indispersion,’ I can’t even decide what to take with me for 
GA or even where to find it. (KB to MC, 15 December 
1983).  
In this letter to Cowley, one of his closest friends for more than 60 years, Burke shows 
just how ashamed and vulnerable he feels by this discovery of the “filthy slur” and its 
seeming ubiquity in his early writing.  And yet, even when he expresses shock at just 
how often “[t]hat filthy slur does keep turning up”, Burke continues to try to justify his 
use of it.  Burke’s explanation can still be read as an attempt to make these slurs 
innocent. In fact, the need to make them innocent seems all the more pressing given 
Burke’s desire to “absolve” himself of his earlier record with his growing awareness of 
his own mortality reflected in his continual reference to the “car accident” and 
“Unfinished Biz.” There is an urgency in both his need and desire to make these slurs 
seem innocent, given their potential impact on the legacy that he will leave behind when 
he dies. In this later letter to Cowley, he explains that “it’s a vulgar kind of snobbery, a 
reflect of my considerable insecurity,” casting light on the way that using these 
derogatory terms helped Burke to soothe his own self-esteem, for in lashing out in 
insecurity, he helped to secure more stable ground for his own place in the racial/social 
hierarchy. As Burke himself notes in RM, “hierarchy is as good an indication as any of 
the way in which the ‘naturalness’ of grades rhetorically reinforces the protection of 
privilege” (Burke RM 141).  
 Burke’s tendency to make a rather unapologetic apology for his anti-Semitism 
is most bluntly revealed in his 1983 “Letter” published in a special issue of Dialectical 
Anthropology dedicated to none other than “The Jewish Question.”13 Careful analysis of 
this letter shows that Burke did not fully escape the anti-Jewish ideas he encountered in 
his youth. Worse still, he slips from unacknowledged anti-Judaism to anti-Israelism 
throughout the “Letter.” These slips suggest that while Burke may have become ever 
more embarrassed by and ashamed of his anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic sentiments, he 
did not provide a thorough repudiation of them. Although, he did admit to Cahill at 
age 92 that he had been “very anti-Semitic” for a long period in his life, this letter 
suggests he could not fully get over it.  
 Like his earlier apologia in the 1968 Preface, Burke begins “Letter from a 
Gentile” by identifying with a minority group, in this case, specifically Jews. He writes, 
“Ever since I learned the word, ‘Diaspora,’ and that was a long time ago, I have inclined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Burke’s letter is addressed to the issue’s editor, Stanley Diamond, the American poet and anthropologist 
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to class myself as ‘in dispersion.’ In this respect I have sometimes referred to myself (to myself) as an 
‘honorary Semite.’ Accordingly, never at a loss for a low pun, when I say ‘What’s the 
program?’ I hear Echo answer, ‘What’s the pogrom?” (161, emphasis added). Burke 
both identifies as “honorary Semite” to himself, and then goes on to trouble this very 
identification.  It is important to note that the way he troubles this identification is to 
slip into anti-Israelism. He continues: 
But this very issue is in dispersion with me. For I’m never quite 
sure that this goy’s ways of feeling in dispersion entitle him to feel as close 
to his Jewish brethren of Diaspora cast as he does (when he does feel 
that close, for often, even before the new motivation takes 
problematic form in Israel, this goy had urgent inducement to 
play down any sense of sympathy with one or another 
antagonist, though even in those cases he felt a sneaking 
bond, as though we glimpsed a common strand of 
understanding within and despite the dastardy of some 
particular local contest). (161, emphasis mine) 
In this passage, Burke’s identifications follow several oscillating twists and turns. First, 
he takes issue with his own decision to identify as “an honorary Semite” because he is 
“never quite sure that...[his].. ways of feeling in dispersion entitle him to feel as close to 
his Jewish brethren of Diaspora cast as he does” (161). Then he notes that he does not 
always feel that close, in part because he tries to “play down any sense of sympathy 
with one or another antagonist” and in part because of the way the “new motivation 
takes problematic form in Israel” (161). He dissociates his identification with Jews in 
the dispersion from those who are living in Israel.  Instead, he groups all Israelis 
together, and in classic Burkean critique offers his own way of “sizing it up”: “The 
Israelis, Begin-style, are in a quite different groove. Maybe I got it wrong, but here’s how I 
size it up: Skilled statecraft acting in behalf of the British Empire had put liberalism to 
expansionistic use by favoring, among the Arabs, a Jewish homeland that would complicate the 
hegemony of that area” (161, emphasis added). Burke’s use of the term “groove” here to 
mean the choices of Israelis, suggests how his earlier anti-Semitism is explicitly linked 
to his current anti-Israelism by the very “stylistic” choices he makes. Earlier the 
“groove” is meant to excuse the severity of his use of anti-Semitic slurs, here it 
functions as an imaginative and stylistic link to the anti-Israelism that grows out of the 
anti-Judaism that girds the earlier anti-Semitism.  
 Burke’s oscillating identifications continue to move back and forth between 
Jews and Israelis throughout the Letter. Though he seems to dissociate Begin-style 
Israelis from other Israelis in later parts of the “Letter” (162), in this passage he moves 
away from this dissociation and instead collapses distinctions between Israel and 
British imperialism. He “sizes” Israel up as an agent of the British Empire, which 
“complicate[s] the hegemony of that area” (161). Rather than recognizing Israel’s 
legitimacy to exist as a sovereign nation, he too easily writes over the historical 
circumstances that gave birth to Israel as a modern state and ignores the religious 
significance and historical claims Jews have to the land. He then employs comparison 
by analogy to liken Israel’s expansionist actions to the genocide committed by the U.S. 
against Native Americans. He also associates Israel’s expansion with the undermining 
of its democratic ideals because “the more territory they include, the greater the 
‘democratic’ problem of the vote” (161, emphasis in original). It is unclear whether he 
makes this genocidal comparison because he is writing in 1983, just one year after the 
horrific events of Sabra and Shatilia, or because he believes that Israel as a nation-state 
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should be “sized up” by such genocidal crimes. Later in the letter, he returns to this 
analogy, this time referring to the Palestinians as the “present ‘natives,’” thus likening 
Palestinians to indigenous people with unquestionable rights to be in the land and 
suggesting that Jewish people by extension are neither indigenous (thus denying the 
continuous presence of Jewish people in “Zion”) nor legitimate in their aspirations for 
nationhood. Burke writes: 
They [Israel] are expansionistic, as nation-states usually are 
(ours having been almost fabulous in that respect, aided 
greatly by the fact that we were also importing new modes of 
production wholly different, an advantage the Israelis have 
slightly over the present ‘natives’ in the biblical homeland, but 
it will become ‘progressively more precarious’). It’s a mean 
situation, made meaner by the inability of USA and USSR 
politicians to agree on rational ways of resolving our conflicts. 
(162, emphasis by quotation in original, emphasis by 
italicization mine) 
In this passage he repeats several times it is a “mean situation,” but in Burke's mind, 
“Israel” is the “opposite of true Diasporism.” As Burke “sees it”: “the only diaspora 
kind of people would be those here or elsewhere who wince at the kind of militaristic 
policies that go by the name of patriotism.” And here it seems Burke attempts to both 
“outJew” and replace the “Jews.” For him, true Jews or diaspora people are only those 
who would be opposed to Israel’s expansionism. So he engages in dissociation once 
again, though this time he dissociates between the true Jews, which he defines as 
diaspora Jews, Jews of the book and intellect, which in his private correspondence he 
values highly and seeks as a resource to transcend none other than ethnic prejudice,14 
and the “bad Israelis,” in other words, Jews who are not of the diaspora, Jews who are 
territorially expansionist and by his analogical extension genocidal.  
Here in the “Letter from a Gentile,” it is as if he has taken an anti-Israel 
activist’s playbook and adopted the argument unquestioningly or unwittingly. The 
warrants girding his Letter’s “stylistic groove” seem to be as follows: Jews have no 
historical presence in and therefore no legitimate right to the land, Jews have engaged 
in genocidal actions to expand militarily and ethnically cleanse the land of the 
“Palestinian natives,” and although Israel professes to be a democracy, the more 
territorial expanding it does the less democratic it becomes. 
 These anti-Israel and anti-Jewish attitudes are ironically underscored by the 
letter’s self-declared purpose as an attempt to “forestall misrepresentations” (167). The 
letter characterizes some of the “unfinished biz” as dealing with the earlier slurs and 
confesses both Burke’s “inability to move on” and his regret/shame/disappointment 
at being unable to do so. Then Burke moves back to the place of Jews in the 
development of capitalism and commerce: “But there was the sense that my whole 
concern with the role of Jews in making investment possible (within the orthodox 
canons which required roundabout fictions for such enterprise) threw things out of 
proportion. How to get the proportions right?” (168). Burke is aware that his own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 There was another side to Burke’s view of Jews: “I was fascinated by Jews, who did seem to me a 
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obsession with Jews and money is “out of proportion” but he is left with the question 
of “how to get the proportions right.” 
  Yet, belying his inability to “move on” or “out of” his anti-Judaism, in his 
attempt to “get the proportions right,” he tells several anecdotes in rapid succession, all 
“ordered” around the theme of anti-Semitic stereotypes of Jews and money, hoarding, 
miserliness, and filth. It is significant that Burke ends this line of thought with the 
positive encounters he had with an actual Jewish person, Matthew Josephson, as it 
reflects the fact that though deeply ingrained, Burke’s anti-Jewish attitudes were not 
impervious to change, especially when he encountered actual Jews.15Although he may 
not have “fully recovered from them,” he seems to have at least mildly revised  (or at 
the very least mitigated) some of his anti-Jewish ideas. As Dale Bertelsen points out, “a 
few years after meeting Matthew Josephson at Columbia University, Burke’s 
derogatory references to Jews seem to disappear from his letters to Cowley” (84–85).16  
Burke then returns to recounting his experiences in high school, this time at 
Peabody High in Pittsburgh, where he claims to have had “another ‘Judeo-Christian’ 
imagining, also with the bleat (the ‘goating’),” this time with his experience of reading 
aloud The Merchant of Venice (169). Burke was assigned to read the role of Shylock and 
explains:  
I got into the role enough to feel very sorry for the poor 
wealthy Jew. He seemed so damned lonesome, and I felt like him 
in that respect. And in exploiting the ‘anti-Semitic psychosis’ of 
his audience so bluntly, along with his humanizing subtleties. . 
. Shakespeare knew why both dramaturgy in general and his 
Christian drama in particular called for a victim that called for 
a touch of compassion. (169, emphasis mine) 
In recalling the sympathy he felt for Shylock’s lonesomeness, Burke contrasts the 
function of the Jew in “Hitlerite rhetoric” with the “treatment of Shylock in 
Shakepearean drama” (emphasis in original, 169): “Hitler’s job was to so dehumanize 
the Jew that ‘Aryans’ owed him nothing. Shakespeare’s job was to so humanize the Jew 
Shylock’s [sic] situation that the text could come into such a beautiful focus from with 
the details of the story. . .” (169).   
 Burke spends most of the final pages of the “Letter from a Gentile” circling 
around his analysis of Merchant of Venice. He asks his audience to consider “what the 
play touches upon, in its way of entertaining a Christian audience (of those times) by its 
variations on the theme of anti-Semitism…” (170). Then he returns to his 
identification with Shylock and admits: 
I, feeling so sorry for Shylock’s lonesomeness when I was 
‘goating’ during my reading of his lines, I couldn’t have said 
so then what I say now; but I felt something along this line: 
The Playwright indulged Jessica. Abandon her father to 
become a Christian that would fit the pattern. But she 
shouldn’t, without signs of regret, have squandered his 
funds” (170, italics in original, underlined emphasis added).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Crable notes that Burke’s encounters with Ellison were also powerful in pushing Burke to think about, if 
not ultimately revise, his ideas about race. 
16 As Burke points out and Bertelsen underscores “Burke himself has acknowledged that Josephson 
‘helped me greatly’ to deal with the anti-Semitic psychosis and to thus bridge the Judeo-Christian divide 
(1983, p. 169)” (85). 
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Even here in the very moment when Burke seems to identify most strongly with 
Shylock, he is only able to identify with the stereotype of money-loving Jews that 
Shylock called forth for Burke. For it is not the loss of the daughter, or her conversion 
to Christianity which plagues Burke, rather it the loss of the “Jew’s money.”17 
Throughout these “scrambled together” notes (Burke, “Letter”, 168), Burke 
perpetuates a slew of negative images about Jews having to do with hoarding, 
scavenging, “filth,” and money. For a man attempting to “absolve” himself of the hurt 
caused by slurs he issued earlier in life, these anecdotes betray the depth to which these 
derogatory ideas about Jewish people were ingrained in Burke’s thinking. Interestingly, 
he points out his own position in the matter by calling attention to the ways “we 
probably all inherit to some degree vestiges of the ambivalent situation which 
Nietzsche’s ingenious forms of anti-Semitism pointed up” (162), acknowledging that 
his ideas inherit vestiges of anti-Semitism.  
At this point, I want to return to a section of the letter analyzed earlier in this 
article where Burke sandwiches his cryptic and coded apology for his use of the term 
“Jew bastard” in the 1935 New Masses review in between two scenic explanations for 
ethnocentric prejudice—that of his father and that of his earlier self.  In the middle of 
his “modulation” about his father’s slurs, Burke slips once again from a description of 
Jewish-Gentile relations into anti-Israel attitudes, and for the third time in this letter 
alone, he compares Israel’s actions to the genocidal actions of the US against Native 
Americans. He begins by highlighting that Jews are a race:   
In any case, turning now to the Jew-Gentile relationship 
specifically, it begins this way for sure: As far back as the 
tribe’s great book, the members of the race, beginning as God’s 
‘peculiar’ people (the translation says) survive not simply as 
individuals, but as Jews.  The Jews themselves impress it upon 
the goyim that they are Jews, and that they are surviving as 
Jews. (164) 
This is the third time in the relatively brief “Letter” that Burke compares Israel’s 
actions to the genocidal actions of the US and collapses Israel’s national desires and 
goals with the British Empire’s imperial, colonial aspirations. And if earlier in the letter 
he attempts to distinguish between those who support Beginism and those Israelis who 
do not, here all Israelis are grouped together. In a variation of chiasmus, Burke 
underscores the proportions of Israel’s actions given the “tiny territory” it calls its own: 
“whereby the Israelis’ ways of expanding so little in so tiny a territory are 
correspondingly as tiny as our nation’s ways of dispossessing the native population 
were grandiose” (164). 
 Burke’s ideas about nation-states from Rhetoric of Motives shed light on the 
complicated interrelations between Burke’s own anti-Jewish influences, anti-Semitic 
slurs, and anti-Israel attitudes. Burke writes, “Once a national identity is built up, it can 
be treated as an individual; hence like an individual its condition can be presented in 
sacrificial terms” (Burke RM 165). To the extent that Burke treats Israel as something 
that can metonymically be represented by “Begin” and all the negative connotations of 
his expansionist political policies, Burke paves the wave for Israel to “be presented in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In his introduction to the special issue in which Burke’s letter appears, “The State of Being Jewish,” 
Diamond offers a contrasting interpretation of Merchant of Venice. “Shakespeare makes it clear that the 
tragedy of Shylock was not in the loss of his money, but in the loss of his daughter; i. e., of his family and 
religion, the two being linked, and therefore-the loss of his self respect” (2). 
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sacrificial terms.” Perhaps Burke’s anti-Semitism is transformed, not out of his system 
in a way but rather into a reflection and representation of his deep-seated anti-Judaism 
“expressed with a difference” (RM 314). Burke writes: “A motive, when genuinely 
transcended, is not dropped, but transformed. It is redeemed not by subtraction, but 
by inclusion in a new fellowship. It is thus not repressed, but expressed, yet expressed 
with a difference: for its ‘nature’ has been ‘graced’” (Burke RM 314). While “graced” 
would not be the word I would choose to describe Burke’s anti-Israel sentiments, his 
understanding of the way motives are never fully “dropped” even when “transformed” 
suggests that his putatively “transformed” anti-Semitism merely reappears in the “new 
fellowship” of anti-Israelism which grows out of his anti-Judaism. 
 A significant portion of Burke’s 1983 “Letter” focuses on his discussion of 
Jews in the Middle Ages, their role in transforming the economy by virtue of the role 
they play as money lenders, and his own experiences with and discussion of 
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice. At one moment he considers what might be the “Next 
Step,” the transcendence that comes from moving beyond the New/Old Testament 
dialectic (165). Imagining a transformative moment beyond the Judeo-Christian 
dialectic, Burke contends that in order to reach it, we must first better understand the 
“past developments in Western history that contributed to any current scars of anti-
Semitism” and for him (165), those past developments all have to do with the role of 
Jews in financial transactions, specifically the role of money lending. From here, he 
launches into an analysis of the biblical passages that relate to dispersion and the 
stipulations under which “usury” is acceptable, offering a lengthy discussion of Jews in 
the Middle Ages.  In an unclosed parenthetical aside, Burke remarks, “It may begin to 
dawn on the reader that this self-stylized ‘honorary Semite’ is becoming evangelical, is 
now turning things around, and wants a whole further band of others to join a New 
Diaspora. . .” (“Letter” 166). Burke is trying to imagine such a “New Diaspora” that 
would replace the current problems associated with the Judeo-Christian dialectic, and 
the anti-Semitism that grows out of it. Yet in so doing, he moves from the specific 
representations of Jews as a “peculiar people” to a universalizing move, claiming that 
humans (substituted here for Jews) are “nature’s ‘peculiar’ people among the various 
biologic organisms on this earth” (“Letter” 166). This substitution seems connected 
with his earlier over-identification with/as a minority in the Preface and with diasporic 
Jews here in the Letter. While this substitution works to eliminate Jews by writing over 
them, just a few sentences later Burke displaces these eliminationist ideas onto John 
Calvin. 
After focusing on Jewish people’s and metics’ role in financial dealings that 
“were beneath the dignity of the free citizen to be directly associated with” (169), 
Burke concludes his letter with these final remarks on Merchant of Venice: 
Moving on up to my problematic wind up… I should add 
one notion, be it right or wrong. It seems to me that the 
offshoots of Calvinism, whatever their reservations against 
Judaism, performed in their way the transitional function that 
the Jewish kind of metic performed elsewhere by introducing 
motives needed for the Next Phase. A significant step is involved 
here; namely, the distinction between ‘interest’ and ‘usury.’ 
Contemporary ‘progress’ has so confused that distinction, 
you wouldn’t know the old place now.  
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 Calvinism succeeds Judaism; the old merchant is 
forced off the stage. And his offspring are obliterated. (171, 
emphasis added) 
In these final lines, Burke casts Calvin as the scapegoat responsible for the connections 
between Jews and usury18 and attempts to absolve himself finally of eliminationist anti-
Semitism. Calvin, using anti-Judaism as a foundation, condemned Jewish usury, Jews as 
materialist, and “saw little value in the continuing presence of Jews and Judaism” 
(Brayme). Like the Merchant of Venice, which concludes with “obliterated offspring” in 
that Rebecca has married out of the faith and thus ends the line of Jewish continuity, 
Burke ends his letter with a similarly bleak future for Jewish peoplehood.  
 Over the course of his life, Burke continually wrestled with the “discomfiture 
of his own making” that resulted from his attempts to confront his anti-Semitism and 
the deep-seated anti-Jewish attitudes that girded it (167).19 At different periods in his 
life, Burke wrestled differently with his increasing shame. Early in his life, he engaged 
in anti-Semitic slurs, shifting the focus from his own loneliness and outsider status to 
those of the Jews he read about as an insecure, teenage youth. Perhaps recognizing 
parts of his insecure and uncomfortable self while reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Burke 
crafted “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’” as an attempt to wrestle with and rid himself 
of the type of anti-Semitism he analyzed so insightfully. Later in his life, when 
reflecting on the writing created by his younger, more insecure self, he attempted to 
make his earlier “indiscretions” innocent by displacing accountability in his historical 
scene. Even at the moments when he attempts to confront his attitudes head on, 
finally accepting some agency by declaring that he was once “very anti-Semitic,” he 
continues to use dissociation to make his earlier “indiscretions” innocent, dissociating 
the language from the content, his stylistic choices from his anti-Jewish beliefs, and his 
earlier, younger self from his current one. 
 My attention to Burke’s anti-Judaism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Israelism 
complicates the hagiography the field engages in around him. As Sharon Crowley once 
said of Richard Weaver: “I find it hard to understand why his work has for so long 
been so uncritically received and why it is presented so abstractly in textbooks meant 
for students. If I had my way, certainly, it would appear there no longer” (90). Just as 
Crable points out Burke’s complicated relations with Ellison and race, this article has 
raised enough questions to trouble the easy-hagiography. I do not mean to suggest that 
we should eliminate Burke from the canon, but we absolutely must raise awareness of 
his troubling attitudes and actions; revise and redraw the “scope” of the 
“representative anecdotes” we use to introduce Burke to graduate students, 
undergraduate students, and one another; and trouble the way we rhetoric scholars so 
easily and uncritically embrace the theoretical apparatus he developed under such 
deeply entrenched anti-Jewish attitudes. As Crable points out, “Biography aside, Burke 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I thank David Frank for inviting me to write this essay and offering tremendous encouragement and 
insight in mulling over the interpretation of these difficult and disturbing ideas. 
19 In the middle of the 1983 “Letter” Burke reflects on his own act of writing by discussing his character in 
Towards a Better Life: “He was in for much discomfiture, largely of his own making—and his author thinks 
of him now, when squirming about in this present effort” (“Letter” 167). The very use of the word 
“squirming” suggests the duality of Burke’s discomfort and his wriggling about to relieve himself of that 
discomfort, specifically with regard to the repeated and continual embarrassment he felt from his earlier 
use of “that filthy slur.” 
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is simply not known for his writings on issues of race” (10), and I might rejoin, neither 
is he known for his anti-Semitism. But it is high time that we begin to teach this 
important scene along with “representative anecdotes” about RHB. 
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